









... how could we rely on probability predictions if by this notion we do not refer to something real and objective? This consideration applies just as much to the classical distribution function ... as to the quantum mechanical density matrix...
M. Born

... only within a [Bayesian] framework do statistical hypotheses acquire any empirical significance...                                                                           
C. Howson and P. Urbach

... by their very nature random phenomena defy any attempt at categorical prediction.
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According to the present stance, the minimal requirement for regarding an hypothesis truthlike is that we could discern in its hitherto corroborative success distinct indications of its projectibility, the extent of which is termed here its projective generality, and of its scope, the extent of which is termed here its integrative generality; two generality traits, the extents of which ought to go hand in hand in a sequence of comparable hypotheses, the larger the one the larger the other, and vice-versa. And to have such  indications, the study suggests, requires two distinct selection mechanisms operating on the hypothesis, where both mechanisms would be effected by deductive-empiric means. Positive selection would select for its projectibility, thereby singling it out from a plethora of hitherto empirically equivalent, but non-projectable, alternatives, and negative selection would select for its scope. This positive selection appears to be necessary in order to validate an otherwise invalid testing procedure; it thus enables us to obtain valid corroborations and refutations, thereby validating a negative selection process which exhibits the comparative standing of a set of available competing hypotheses, as regards their comparative scopes. It was pointed out that such positive selection may obtain in relation to the foundational theories of inertial physics via the distinct and valid testability of their respective symmetric-structures.​[1]​ Those structures are interpreted here to be hypotheses about the projectibility of the theories within their respective domains, the bounds of which those structures largely condition, in the context of a set of common constraints (CC) satisfied by the theories, i.e. Coherence (both internal and external), Parsimony (theoretical economy), and Hamilton's Principle (HP). The suggestion was that HP could have brought positive selection to bear on these theories via deductive-empiric means, thereby rationally underpinning the inductive and/or apriorist practice of parsimony with respect to them. The tenability of the stance depends, therefore, on whether the foundational theories satisfy this guiding context, and on the ability of this context to deliver the realist desideratum. But neither would it be reasonable to expect that deep objective physical knowledge could have developed in an epistemological and methodological void. 




On the status of statistical mechanics


... statistical mechanics presents us not with a simple, well formulated and easily presented theory, but rather, with something of a hodgepodge of approaches, formulations, and schools. 
L. Sklar

We do now understand how there can be an additional structure of the world that although not involving any ontology not posited by the remaining structure of the reducing theory, can introduce novel elements into any structural picture of the world.
L. Sklar

It remains very hard to see how such posits [posits that lead to t-irreversible results] can somehow be eliminated or made innocuous. To this extent, thermodynamics and statistical mechanics do require the positing of fundamental facts about the world whose origin seems to remain outside the provenance of the underlying theories of dynamics or the underlying constitutive facts about the systems to which statistical mechanics and thermodynamics are applied.
L. Sklar







Any  attempt to assess the status of the non-foundational kinetic theory of St.M. - qua theory of both equilibrium and non-equilibrium states of thermal systems - must confront the clash between its statistical and t-irreversible character and the deterministic and t-reversible character of the foundational micro-dynamical theory, meant to provide an account of St.M..​[3]​ Clearly, if the relation of St.M. to its foundational theory was unproblematically deductive, and if we had good grounds for the view that the foundational theory could be truthlike, then we would be in a good position to claim that St.M. could also be truthlike. But the relation between St.M. and its foundational theory is far from being unproblematically deductive. There exist a number of routes from the foundational theory to St.M., some of which are in actual conflict, and each is replete with highly idealised suppositions and interpretations. Although the situation does not compel one towards un-orthodox approaches to St.M. - subjectivism, t-irreversible dynamics, intervention from the external world, etc. - views that are themselves not unproblematic, it does cast serious doubt on the viability of interpreting the theory and its probabilities realistically (Sklar, 1993). Nonetheless, there are indeed deductive links between the foundational theory and St.M., suggesting the latter's positive selection via such links. However, the precarious derivation of St.M. from its foundational theory, plus the problem associated with the testability of statistical hypotheses, cast doubt on whether negative selection operates on St.M., and hence whether, given the present stance, we could regard the theory to be truthlike. 
How then is one to see the relation between the theory of the micro-constituents (or the fine-grained description of a thermal system in terms of its micro states) and the theory of the macro-system (or the coarse-grained description)? And how is one to interpret the physical relation between the behaviour of the constituents and that of the macro-system, i.e. between what we may suppose the two theories to describe? Boltzmann's original approach (see, e.g. Pais, 1979) to the route from the foundational deterministic micro-dynamical theory to the statistical theory is based on '… two independent ingredients': (1) his 'distinguishibility axiom' (that the individual constituents are distinguishable in terms of their initial conditions and their subsequent trajectories); and (2) 'statistical independence; that is, for an ideal classical gas the individual molecules have no a priori preference for any particular region in phase space.' This latter point expresses an indifference principle which leads to an initial probability distribution, over an ensemble of possible initial micro-states compatible with the macro-constraints.​[4]​ The two ingredients, coupled with the constraints imposed by the foundational micro-dynamical theory - energy and momentum conservation - lead to t-irreversible kinetic equations. But closer analysis indicates that this irreversibility is not watertight, because there is a possibility of small fluctuations about macro-states of the system as it tends towards the equilibrium state from an initial non-equilibrium one, as well as about the equilibrium state itself; and such fluctuations indicate a very small but finite possibility of a large scale move towards a more ordered state from any less ordered state, including the equilibrium one (see, e.g. Lavenda, 1985). Thus Boltzmann's H-theorem may be read thus: if at any time t0 the system is in a non-equilibrium state then it is overwhelmingly likely that the value of dH/dt will be negative at t0, and hence it is overwhelmingly likely that H is a monotonically decreasing function with time; a claim that can accommodate the formal recurrence and reversibility requirements of the foundations of the theory (Tolman, 1979; Grad, 1958; Guggenheim, 1959). But the ingredients on which the analysis is based have no rationale other than that they lead to the desired outcome: equations that can account for the evidence stemming from interactions of our measuring instruments with thermal systems. In particular, we are then able to account for phenomenological thermodynamics, as that theory relates to at least simple equilibrium systems - systems, in relation to which good arguments can be had  for correlating appropriately averaged values of dynamic quantities with their corresponding thermodynamic quantities. 
The following sort of arguments are employed in defence of this kind of approach: Tolman (1979, pp. 64-65) on the indifference principle in the classical context: 'With the help of  Liouville's theorem, it has been shown that the principles of mechanics do not themselves contain any tendency for phase points to crowd into one region in the phase space rather than another; and hence, in the absence of any knowledge except that our systems do obey the laws of mechanics, it would be arbitrary to make any assumption other than that of equal a priori probabilities for different regions of equal extent in the phase space ... The methods being statistical in character have to be based on some hypothesis as to a priori probabilities, and the hypothesis chosen is the only postulate that can be introduced without proceeding in an arbitrary manner.' And Guggenheim (1959, p. 48) on the indifference principle in the quantum context: 'As is so often the case in theoretical developments, this hypothesis is not itself suitable for direct empirical test. It has however the indirect check that is provided by the extensive agreement found between the deductive results obtained by experiment. Moreover it is the simplest hypothesis if not the only simple hypothesis, consistent with the laws of quantum mechanics. It is a consequence of these laws that the probability wik per unit time for a system known to be in the state i to change into the state k is equal to the probability wki per unit time for the system known to be in the state k to change into the state i. In view of this symmetrical relationship between pairs of states any hypothesis for weighting unequally would seem on the face of it unreasonable.' In both cases there is an implicit appeal to a non-arbitrary convention as regards the indifference principle - a convention that is based on, but not dictated by, the respective foundational theory. The approach is just what would be expected and what is desirable from a realist standpoint about both the foundational theory and the "derived" kinetic theory. For if we want the theory of the aggregate system to be descriptive of that system and account for its properties, which its constituents do not possess, then  the origins of that theory must be sufficiently "plastic" to allow for that possibility without contradicting the fundamentals of the foundational theory. What is important is not the precise way we choose to deal with the fact that the micro-states cannot be specified, but rather that the new theory be capable of fulfilling its function. Such a theory is arrived at using fundamental constraints obtained from the foundational theory, i.e. conservation laws, plus the indifference principle suggested by the foundational theory but not dictated by it, plus a "molecular chaos" hypothesis about the "random" character of collisions, which expresses the constraint imposed by the boundaries of the macro-system. From the perspective of the macro-system, the randomicity hypothesis can be seen as an approximation to the deterministic character of the motion of the systems' constituents. As indicated by Grad (1958, p.206), 'Something like randomness is found to be a property of strictly deterministic systems when the number of degrees of freedom is large. We can say that a reversible system will some times approximate the behaviour of an irreversible system to an arbitrary degree of accuracy.'​[5]​ 
Although this approach does succeed in showing how it is possible to go from the foundational theory to St.M. in not entirely an arbitrary manner, it leaves the clashes between the theories more or less intact, as regards the issues of determinism/indeterminism and t-reversibility/t-irreversibility. Moreover, we are still not much wiser as to how it is that the nomically deterministic and t-reversible character of the dynamics of individual constituents give rise to the statistical character of the dynamics of the aggregate system and its overwhelmingly likely t-irreversible behaviour.​[6]​ Nor do other approaches succeed in providing a fully satisfactory account of this problem (Sklar, 1993; 2000).​[7]​ We thus have no detailed account of St.M., i.e. an account that would lead directly (without the introduction of hypotheses extraneous to the foundational theory) from deterministic and reversible microdynamics to indeterministic and irreversible St.M.. Apparently, we are faced with two related, but also somewhat autonomous, levels of the reality of thermal-systems, and with that a fully satisfactory detailed account of the relation between those levels is not available. Clearly, the ground level plus the macro boundary conditions impose some constraints on the macro level, but the macro level is not fully determined by its foundations. We may thus expect to find an account of the macro level to be incompatible with an account of its ground level, and hence no complete reduction of the macro level to that of the ground level is likely. This incomplete reductionist thesis holds, I think, generally, and it holds whether the notion of reduction stands for an intertheory relation or an explanatory relation between a theory of a ground level and attributes of a macro level.​[8]​
The situation as regards thermal systems and their constituents may perhaps be understood as follows. There are two interrelated ways of "seeing" a thermal-system. There is a micro and a macro view with their accompanying theoretical descriptions, corresponding to two levels of the reality of such a system. The micro-view sees only trajectories of individual constituents (neglecting their possible internal structure), and if we could but "follow" those trajectories both theoretically and experimentally, then we would presumably find them to conform to the dictates of the foundational theory. But such "following" is open only to a Laplacean demon, free of all limits to human knowledge and capabilities - as regards knowledge of initial and boundary conditions, as regards experimental observation, etc. The macro-view sees only the aggregate system, and from this perspective the t-dependent intersections of the trajectories of the constituents, an outcome of their t-dependent collisions, appear to be random and hence t-irreversible. But this "appearance" may reflect the actuality of the macro-level, in so far as the aggregate system's thermal interactions with the world external to itself is concerned. Thus, in so far as such interactions are concerned the aggregate system requires a statistical t-irreversible description. Not surprisingly, therefore, outcomes of interactions between such a system and instruments designed to observe it are accountable with the aid of such a description, i.e. the system appears to effect or cause the instruments to "see" it qua statistical t-irreversible system. (Of course, such measurements record only the effects of the posited distributions and their behaviour, but then the same is true of measurements designed to "see" the properties of say electrons.) Thus, in so far as the thermal interaction of such a system with its surroundings is concerned, its statistical and t-irreversible traits may be no less real than the traits of the constituents are, in so far as their mutual interactions are concerned. Seen in this way, it is not surprising to find that the statistical description succeeds in accounting for the interaction of thermal systems with their surroundings, including instruments designed to observe them. 
Thus the set of individual constituents with their particular properties and interactions, i.e. the posited ontology, when satisfying the thermodynamic constraints, 
may be regarded to be an "emerged" system possessing novel traits, in so far as its thermal interactions with the world external to itself is concerned.​[9]​ Only the macro-view or macro-account can be expected to "see" those traits. It follows that we should not expect the macro-level account to be completely derivable from the micro-level account, since the latter is bound to miss out on the novel traits. No complete reduction of the macro-level account is, therefore, likely.​[10]​ Nonetheless, the account of the macro-system in terms of distributed quantities can be more complete, in respect of the properties of the macro-system that are relevant in its thermal interactions with its surroundings, than a micro-dynamical account could possibly be.​[11]​ On this view both accounts admit realist interpretations - a possibility attributable to the fact that they are about diverse, somewhat autonomous, albeit related, levels of the same system: the aggregate-level, and the level of discrete micro-constituents within the confines of the thermodynamic constraints. Mutatis mutandis as regards the relation between levels of more complex physical, physico-chemical, bio-chemical, and bio systems, as well as the relation between such systems themselves. In all such cases the constituents of the quasi-autonomous aggregate and discrete levels are the same, and may ultimately be traceable to the fundamental constituents of physical reality. Accordingly, the myriad of composite systems - including atoms, nuclei of atoms, etc. - with their particular traits are attributable to myriads of varied conditions which may have operated on the fundamental ontology, and on subsequent systems composed of that ontology. All  this merely instantiates the point that as far as attributes are concerned, emerged physical, physico-chemical, bio-chemical, and biological "wholes" can be "more" - in the sense of being  different - than the "sum" of their parts. This would suggest that the complete reductionist thesis as regards attributes and/or theories about them, is untenable.​[12]​ From this perspective St.M. is best regarded an independent or quasi-independent theory of a quasi-autonomous level of thermal systems. It is not a foundational theory because it is not about fundamental interactions, but rather about systems that are composites of constituents interacting in a variety of ways - systems which appear to make up the bulk of matter in the universe. The statistical mechanical state description, a distribution function, and state equation, say Boltzman's equation, differ radically from their dynamical counterparts - an unavoidable consequence of our inability to specify micro-states of thermal-systems. And the overwhelming likelihood condition on the theory's prediction of the approach to equilibrium appears but a consequence of apriori posits, which mask both the theory's  inconsistencies with its foundational theory and our inability to provide a detailed account of wholistic traits (Shimony, 1993a and 1993b). 
Given the quasi-independence of St.M. from the foundational theory meant to account for it,  its status should be assessed independently. Nonetheless, its links with that theory - links tied up with spatio-temporal invariance - do indicate that the projection problem as posed by Jeffreys could be obviated in respect of St.M.: that the theory could be positively selected from Jeffreys' aberrant alternatives to it, and hence that it could partake in the epistemic benefits of the symmetric-structure of physical reality. We may thus have some distinct critically based indication of the projectibility of the theory across its domain. But does customary negative selection also operate on the theory? Is the theory testable (refutable) for its performance? Consider its key prediction: if an isolated thermal system is at any time in a non-equilibrium state, then it will with overwhelming likelihood move spontaneously towards the equilibrium state. Now it turns out that in respect of terrestrial thermal systems, especially typical laboratory systems, there are good non-arbitrary considerations for regarding this uncategorical  prediction to be a categorical one (but for possible small fluctuations), as would be required for the theory to be refutable.​[13]​ Firstly, given the extremely small value of Boltzmann's constant (of the order of 10-24), the theory suggests that large scale deviations from the prediction is extremely unlikely even for relatively large periods of an approach to equilibrium (Lavenda, 1985); secondly, the time scales involved in the approach to equilibrium of typical laboratory systems, i.e. their relaxation rates, are miniscule (of the order of micro- seconds) compared to the cosmic time scale for the recurrence theorem to come into play.​[14]​ It seems that ever since Maxwell discovered the theory it has been standard practice to regard the prediction as categorical, since only then does the theory provide good accounts of a large number of phenomena - e.g. specific heats, diffusion, viscosity, Brownian motion, black-body radiation, etc. - accounts that also serve as tests of the theory. Maxwell's use of classical St.M. to account for the specific heats of gases (1859) led to the first indication that this theory, and with it Cl.M., may not have had it quite right, for the theory could not account for the specific heats of some gases. The second instance of what are now regarded to be refutations of classical physics via classical St.M. is Planck's attempt  to account for black-body radiation (1900). (See e.g. Feynman, et al., 1963, Ch. 40, for the historical claims.) From a purely logical point of view, these failures of classical St.M. could have been attributed to the uncategorical character of its key prediction. Had this been done the development of Q.M. may well have been delayed. One can see in this approach of physicists an example of how Popper's methodological outlook is close to actual practice, because it is intimately linked to the idea of the unavoidability, but also rationality, of non-arbitrary methodological conventions. In this case the convention is to regard the uncategorical prediction to be a categorical one for at least terrestrial thermal-systems. It is only in this context that the two failures of classical St.M. become serious problems for the theory. (Although Maxwell and Boltzmann differed on method, and hence on how to deal with the specific heat anomaly, they both recognised that the anomaly presents a serious problem for the theory - de Regt, 1996.) In any case, non-arbitrary conventions are explicitly or implicitly in use as regards tests of both deterministic and statistical hypotheses, if only with respect to the tentative acceptance or rejection of available evidence. Clearly, whilst logic is an indispensable tool for the critical method, the quest for knowledge is a process far too complex for it to be driven by any algorithmic procedure, whatever its rational credentials may be. Feynman's remark (1963, sect. 39-1) aptly describes the situation in physics: '... successes come to those who start from a physical point of view, people who have a rough idea where they are going and then begin by making the right kind of approximation, knowing what is big and what is small in a given complicated situation.'  
If the key prediction of St.M. is seen as categorical for at least terrestrial systems, then the detailed testability of the theory's performance hinges on: (a) measurability of its predicted distributions at equilibrium,​[15]​ and (b) measurability of the approach to equilibrium. Thus if (a) and (b) are realisable than the performance of the theory would be under critical empiric control. But are they realisable? In particular is (a) realisable: are statistical mechanical distributions testable unproblematically? We need to distinguish two sorts of distributions. Distributions, best  referred to by a probability density, only segments of which can be generated by repeated experiments, as in the quantum mechanical case, or in games of chance, etc; and distributions, best referred to by a number density, which we posit to exist in their entirety in quasi-isolated statistical mechanical systems, realised either in laboratories or in nature, e.g. stars.​[16]​ The problem associated with the testability or falsifiability of probability density distributions has been extensively discussed and ways of meeting the problem have been proposed (Popper, 1977, Ch.8 & New Appendices VI and IX; Redhead, 1974; Popper, 1983, pp. 281-346 and 391-394; Watkins, 1984, pp. 244-246; Gillies, 1973 and 1990;  Howson and Urbach, 1993, pp. 171-174).​[17]​ But whatever one's stance on those proposals, the problem simply does not arise in relation to the testability of number density distributions. Their testability depends only on the availability of experimental techniques for measuring them. It turns out that in the case of at least some experimental thermal-systems such techniques are available, making it possible to observe (measure) quasi-stationary distributions, and in many cases even the approach to such distributions.​[18]​ I conclude that with respect to many systems St.M. is distinctly testable for its performance, as regards its predictions of the character of statistical mechanical distributions and their temporal evolution. And given the constraints of energy and momentum conservation imposed on it by its foundational theory, constraints which we know to be linked to spatio-temporal invariance, we may also have a good rationale for the projectibility, and hence applicability, of St. M. across its domain. The theory, along with its distributions, meet, therefore, the presently proposed criterion for being truthlike.​[19]​  





On the status of quantum mechanics


The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving predictions, of definite or statistical character.
N. Bohr

I still believe in the possibility of a model of reality - that is to say, of a theory which represents things themselves and not merely the probability of their occurrence.
A. Einstein

... the "real" in physics is to be taken as a type of program, to which we are, however, not forced to cling a priori. No one is likely to be inclined to attempt to give up this program within the realm of the "macroscopic" ... . But the "macroscopic" and the "microscopic" are so inter-related that it appears impracticable to give up this program in the "microscopic" alone. Nor can I see any occasion anywhere within the observable facts of the quantum-field for doing so, unless, indeed, one clings a priori to the thesis that the description of nature by the statistical scheme of quantum-mechanics is final.
A. Einstein

With each successive advance we make we are pressed to give up more and more of our classical realism.
L. Sklar

So the notion of measurement or observation is utterly mysterious in quantum mechanics, as are the notions of truth and probability.
J. Bub

It is entirely appropriate for a physics that is both fundamental and probabilistic to apply directly to individual systems.
N.D. Mermin

It may be that our way of describing the world is inadequate, and the metaphysical notions implicit in it inappropriate, for dealing with a realm so far removed in scale from our ordinary experience.
R.I.G. Hughes

My final conclusion is that the high plateau which we have reached in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a darkling plain.
A. Shimony

Every interpretation that preserves the equations and the connection with our perceptive experiences has an equal claim to be regarded as possibly the true one, and may be used with equal right by the physicist to clothe the bare bones of his mathematics... Either hypothesis, therefore, is equally legitimate, and neither can be regarded as having a superior claim to truth. The reason is that the physical world can have the same structure on the one hypothesis as on the other.
B. Russell
The interpretative problems of Q.M. stem from the following considerations: (1) There are a number of radically different standard formulations, generally regarded mathematically and empirically equivalent: Schrödinger's wave mechanics, Heisenberg's matrix mechanics, Feynman's path integral formulation, etc..​[20]​ (2) Given that equivalence, we may take Schrödinger's formulation as representative and note its baffling trait: unlike in the case of all other deterministic and statistical physical theories, the state description ψ - a complex-valued wave function - apparently encodes both definite and statistical information; which is baffling whether ψ is taken to refer to an individual system or to an ensemble of identically prepared systems. (3) In contrast to all other physical theories, the formalism of Q.M. appears to implicate   non-separability of states of previously interacting systems (entanglement), and an accompanying non-locality (of some sort); a feature indicative of the theory's incompleteness, if one insists, qua realist, on separability being a necessary aspect of realist physical description (Einstein's stance; see Howard, 1989). But attempts at completion via local hidden variables that would preserve a classical realist picture of the non-relativistic quantum domain (separability, full locality - no instantaneous signalling nor influence of any sort, value definiteness of all observables, determinism, etc.) appears untenable today, on both formal and empiric grounds (Bell, 1964 and 1966a; Bub, 2000b; Aspect, et al.,1981). Thus non-separability, hence also some form of non-locality, as well as some indeterminacy (hence potentiality), appear to be intrinsic traits of this "phenomenological" quantum domain ("phenomenological" on the assumption that there could be a subquantum level; see note 30). But even if one accepts the objectivity of these traits in the non-relativistic quantum domain, it is still not clear whether the standard formalism is complete even in respect of such a domain (it is certainly incomplete with respect to the relativistic quantum domain - as we shall see), given that the formalism does not give a clear indication of the bounds of its domain (h  0 does not follow from the formalism, hence the boundary problem, to which we shall return). From instrumentalist and empiricist perspectives, oblivious to metaphysical concerns, the issue of completeness could at most relate only to our judgements about the adequacy of the theory's predictions, whether definite or statistical. But from a realist perspective the issue of completeness is paramount; and if regarded to be incomplete, in whatever sense, then the question arises whether the problem lies with the state description, the equation meant to govern its temporal evolution, or both; Finally, (4) the standard formalism admits a plethora of interpretations both subjective and objective (see works cited in note 19). However, an interpretation once held by Einstein and Popper is today untenable on both formal and empiric grounds.​[21]​ Alternative interpretations generally differ regarding the source of quantum statistics - in the case of no collapse interpretations they also differ regarding the observable taken to be determinate (Bub and Clifton 1996) - and if that source is not held to be classical, then neither would the quantum probabilities be classical (Bub, 2000b). As Feynman put it (1951, p. 533): '... nature with her infinite imagination has found another set of principles for determining probabilities; a set other than that of Laplace, which nevertheless does not lead to logical inconsistencies... the laws of probabilities which are conventionally applied are quite satisfactory in analysing the behaviour of the roulette wheel but not the behaviour of a single electron or a photon of light.'​[22]​
However, notwithstanding this extraordinary state of affairs surrounding the standard quantum mechanical formalism, the possibility of its truthlike character is easily discernible in the context of the present stance. We begin by noting that the formalism yields both definite and statistical predictions, which any alternative version or subsequent theory would need to recover. Leaving aside the statistical predictions, the tests of which are admittedly problematic (as noted above), all definite predictions are well corroborated in respect of a host of systems: e.g. predictions regarding energy spectra of atoms and molecules.​[23]​ And within this great corroborative success we can discern the distinct contribution of the formalism's symmetric-structure: of the distinct corroboration of its definite predictions linked to, or generated by, its embedded symmetries. Although the discrete symmetries generate testable consequences that differ from their classical counterparts (Hughes, 1989, Ch. 7; Wick, 1958; Gasiorowicz, 1966, Ch. 30: Sakurai, 1964), the continuous basic chronogeometric symmetries generate the same Noether invariants as in the classical case. For isolated systems, moreover, '... the principles of conservation of energy and momentum hold [within the available experimental resolution] in individual cases and are not merely statistical laws.' (Hughes, 1989, p. 277). Thus, from the viewpoint of the present stance, the formalism yields definite testable predictions that could yield a distinct and valid empiric indication of its projectibility - bearing on its positive selection - as well as of its performance - bearing on its negative selection.​[24]​ This claim is based on the premise that the corroborative success of the formalism stemming from the successes of all its definite predictions - those directly traceable to symmetries plus all others, but neglecting statistical predictions - is a sufficient indication of both its projectibility and its scope. Given this proviso, the truthlike character of the formalism (or at any rate its possibility) is not in doubt, from the standpoint taken here.  
The idea that the formalism is truthlike suggests that it aproximates the truth about a real non-relativistic quantum domain, and hence that its 'observables' (or at least some of them) capture something of its 'beables' (Bell, 1973); and hence its successes, both  definite and statistical.   
There are at least four intertwined considerations which challenge this realist conception of the formalism: 
(1) The multiplicity of radically different albeit mathematically equivalent standard formulations, a situation that can be interpreted to suggest different ontic pictures about the quantum domain, thereby casting doubt on any realist interpretation.   
(2) The fact that no ordinary intuitive sense can be made of some of the traits of the standard formalism - e.g. that the state description should encode both definite and statistical information - nor of some of its predictions - e.g. the superposition state, and some sort of non-local phenomena. 
(3) The variety of possible interpretations compatible with the standard formulations. 
(4) The measurement problem (and its associated problems of entanglement, non-separability and non-locality): the inability of the linear deterministic formalism to predict with certainty just which specific state of a superposition of states of a quantum system would be detected in an interaction of such a system with a classical apparatus. The formalism is unable to account for such apparently undetermined events. But the problem is even more acute. As Leggett points out (1998, p.138):      '... quantum mechanics, in any of its current formulations, fails the most basic of tests, namely the ability to give an account, not just of why we got the specific result we did in a given experiment, but of how a single definite result emerged at all.' This problem has often been the impetus for non-realist interpretations, as well as for attempting to bring the "observer" into the physics of the measurement process.
From the viewpoint of the present stance the above problems appear thus:
(1) Regarding the multiplicity of standard formulations: the fundamental ontology is seen here to be symmetric-structure, presumed to be captured by the invariant traits of the alternative formalisms. Hence mathematical equivalence is the central consideration since that would yield equivalence of symmetric-structure. We would thus expect the diverse standard formulations to be mathematically equivalent, which is generally thought to be the case. 
(2) Regarding the counter-intuitive character of some of the traits of the domain of the theory: It is unreasonable to expect to make ordinary intuitive sense of theories dealing with domains far removed from our phenomenological level. This follows from the understandable limits of our perceptions, and of the ordinary conceptions linked to them (e.g. "particle" and "wave")​[25]​, for interpreting and describing the furniture of deep physical reality - understandable, in the light of our evolutionary and historical origins. As Mermin (1998, p. 75) aptly observed, '... this ability of ours [perception] and its limitation presumably arise from our having evolved under the selective pressure of having to deal with macroscopic things like tigers and oranges, but not ... with microscopic things like atoms and molecules.' 
(3) Regarding the possibility of a variety of radically alternative interpretations of the theory (i.e. of the standard equivalent formulations), suggesting incompatible ontologies other than symmetric-structure. Although (2) suggests that we ought not be overly concerned about this feature, nonetheless, given that the theory admits radically alternative interpretations all of which tax our intuitions, the ontological incompatibilities cannot be dismissed lightly. It could be that this situation points to the incompleteness of the theory - as regards the description of state or of its unitary evolution, or both - with respect to its purported non-relativistic domain. Indeed, even a single interpretation may suggest as much. Thus on Mermin's interpretation, perfectly compatible with the theory, the theory is only about statistical correlations, leaving out the correlata in respect of which the correlations are meant to hold​[26]​ - shades of Poincaré's structural realism. Mermin (1998, p. 763) is well aware that this is a serious conceptual problem for his interpretation: 'Whether this is a fatal defect of the [interpretation], whether it is a manifestation of the primitive state of our thinking about objective probability, or whether it is a consequence of the inability of physics to encompass conscious awareness, remains to be explored.'​[27]​ But the fact that the theory admits an interpretation based on the idea that it is only about correlations and not correlata seems like a good indication of the theory's incompleteness - although that interpretation oversimplifies, for the theory does have something to say about the correlata, e.g. their states and their evolution, and their symmetric and other structures. Be that as it may, if we insist that non-local correlations must be caused - either in the sense of one causing the other, or in the sense of having a common cause - then the fact that the theory is unable to indicate the source of any causality points to its incompleteness.​[28]​ Of course, we can regard the theory complete and tailor our conception of physical reality to this or that interpretation, but that is to disregard the ontological problem which the possibility of radically alternative interpretations poses; it is also to adopt a 'tranquilizing philosophy'.​[29]​  
(4) Regarding the measurement problem: this problem could have a variety of possibly intertwined sources, and hence a number of possibly intertwined "accounts". The three noted below all point to some form of incompleteness which could be responsible for the problem, individually or jointly, i.e. for that the standard formalism is unable to fully account for measurement interactions: (a) the boundary problem as between standard Q.T. and classical theory, or as between their respective domains; (b) symmetric incompleteness; and (c) the possibly non-adiabatic character of standard measurement interactions. 
             (a) The boundary problem: As indicated in sect. 1, III-2, given a sequence of comparable theories, then the validity of each theory will be in principle domain specific relative to its successor, and generally de facto domain specific relative to its predecessors. This is because successors point to the factual conditions which demarcate the in principle validity, hence applicability, of their predecessors; conditions which thus demarcate the domains of the predecessors from the domain of the successor - as in the case of relativity theories pointing to the factual conditions that demarcate the validity of their predecessor classical theory. And whilst successors are in principle valid, hence applicable, in much of the domains of their predecessors - since the domain of a successor, is meant in large part to subsume the domains of its predecessors - the successors themselves suggest why it is that this in principle applicability generally makes no practical sense, i.e. the successors indicate why it is that the phenomena they are able to cover, which their predecessors are unable to do, are undetectable, even were they to occur, in the domains of their predecessors; hence the applicability of the successor in the domains of its predecessors is generally de facto unwarranted (or unnecessary). Hypotheses are thus in effect domain specific, notwithstanding the in principle validity of successors in much of the domains of their predecessors. But as regards standard Q.T. it is unclear whether this successor is even in principle valid in the domain of its predecessor classical theory, because Q.T. fails to give a clearcut formal indication of the boundary between the two domains, i.e. of just how classical theory approximates Q.T. (as indicated, h  0 does not follow from the quantum formalism, nor does hυ/kT<<1). This failure on the part of Q.T. could be indicative of its incompleteness with respect to its purported non-relativistic quantum domain, notwithstanding its possible Tr with respect to that domain, i.e. it is supposed that a more complete Q.T. (perhaps one that would emerge from a quantum-gravity theory) would provide a clear indication of the in principle validity limit of classical theory, with respect to Q.T. or, alternatively, it would clarify the boundary between the classical and quantum domains. Of course we may posit the in principle validity of Q.T. in the classical domain, but then we need an account, stemming from Q.T., of the apparent absence of quantum effects in the classical domain, i.e. Q.T. would need to account for why its application is de facto unwarranted in the classical domain. Given that it is unclear whether the applicability of standard Q.T. is either in principle or de facto warranted in the classical domain, it is perhaps not to be expected that standard Q.T. should be able to provide a full account of interactions between the two domains, i.e. perhaps we ought not expect standard Q.T. to be able to fully handle the interface between the quantum and classical domains, given that it fails to provide a clear formal indication regarding its applicability or non-applicability in the latter domain;​[30]​a failure seen here to be an indication of its formal incompleteness, quite independently of its alleged incompleteness on the ground that it fails to respect our classical intuitions regarding separability, etc. (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 1935)​[31]​.    
               The lesson of at least one modified stochastic version of Q.T. (Ghirardi, et.al., 1986) is that the domain of standard Q.T. does indeed in principle not subsume the classical domain. For the domain of the modified theory does appear to encompass the domains of both standard Q.T. and that of classical theory. The modified theory is thus able to exhibit the boundary between the two domains, as well as why that boundary is blurred; thereby indicating the in principle domain specificity of the two theories, in relation to each other.Thus the boundary between the two domains may be expressed by the condition that demarcates the classical domain from the standard quantum one, i.e. where quantum energies (given by hυ) are small compared to typical classical energies. Thus energy conditions attendant with the classical domain (e.g. for thermal systems: hυ/kT<<1) may render quantum effects, or traits (including superposition of states) undetectable (even for Schrödinger's cat), even were they to occur in that domain. Given the boundary between the two domains (i.e. that of standard Q.T. and clssical theory), even if blurred, and given that measurement constitutes an interaction between those domains at that boundary - an interaction '… which amplifies microscopic events to macroscopic consequences.' (Bell, 1984), but at the unavoidable price of the macroscopic apparatus interfering with the microscopic events - it would be unreasonable to expect either theory alone to be able to account for such interaction processes. This point is reinforced by the ability of two very diverse modified theories - in respect of which it is possible to claim that their domains subsume the domains of standard Q.T. and of classical theory - to account, albeit not unproblematically, for measurement interactions. ​[32]​ 
               (b) Symmetric incompleteness: As noted above, the boundary problem suggests that the standard formulation could be incomplete with respect to its purported non-relativistic domain. Thus incompleteness need not be inferred from the apparent counterintuitive indications of the formulation, nor need it be inferred from its indeterministic element (i.e. a more complete theory may still contain a statistical element - e.g. a theory that would take account of possible sources of decoherence, Holland, 1993, p. 335).​[33]​ Be that as it may, the present stance suggests unambiguously the formalism's symmetric incompleteness: its failure to take account of the Lorentz correction of Galilean invariance, and hence its failure to take account of the invariant c. Of course, this incompleteness attests only to incompleteness with respect to the relativistic-quantum domain. Nonetheless, if the non-relativistic domain is in fact not sufficiently demarcated from the relativistic one, then incompleteness with respect to the latter may also point to an incompleteness with respect to the former.​[34]​ The present stance also suggests the symmetric incompleteness of S.R., again with respect to the relativistic-quantum domain: its failure to take account of Planck's invariant h. Accordingly, both theories are incomplete, with respect to the relativistic-quantum domain. (This incompleteness of both theories also follows from Bohm's formulation.)​[35]​ The particular symmetric incompleteness of the two theories exhibits what may be their crucial formal incompatibility. It is therefore not all that surprising that the theories should differ fundamentally on the state description, and that this should lead to clashes on such ontic issues as determinism vs indeterminism, continuum vs discreteness, and locality vs nonlocality.​[36]​ Whether the quantum field theoretic approach towards greater symmetric completeness is sound remains to be seen (sect. G). Perhaps an all unifying theory with quite unexpected symmetries could inform on that question. But it would not be surprising if such a deeper theory would land us with even stranger "fish" than the present theories (Redhead, 1989, p. 169).
              (c) The possibly non-adiabatic character of measurement interactions: As discussed in sect. C, in imposing Hamilton's Principle (HP) on theories (formalisms), we suppose that the physical processes they are to account for are adiabatic (in the sense that the variation of the independent variables, implicated in the description of the processes, are "small and slow" across t = t2 – t1, the time or spacetime interval involved in HP ). Prima facie this restriction appears to severely limit the sort of processes physics can handle. But that is not in fact the case given that what constitutes adiabatic change is relative to ambient conditions, i.e. to the unrestricted state of the system at t1, and to the unrestricted "smallness" of t, so long as it is finite. Nonetheless, it may indeed follow from this restriction that if, even on a quantum time scale, and a fortiori on a classical one, standard quantum measurements, as well as other discrete quantum events, constitute non-adiabatic processes (in the sense indicated), then we may expect that neither the standard quantum formalism, and a fortiori not classical theory, should be able to fully describe such events. This view is unaltered by the consideration that Q.T. satisfies a quantum version of HP, ​[37]​ because that version does not remove the imposition of the adiabatic constraint referred to; it merely shows that satisfaction of HP on the part of the standard Q.T. formalism suggests that the path across t will be the one of maximum probability.
The view that the non-diabatic character of measurement interactions may be responsible for the measurement problem is made more plausible in the light of proposed 'protective measurements' (Aharonov, et al., 1993): measurements of long duration and weak coupling to the measuring probe compared to standard measurements - thus measurements that are more likely to result in an adiabatic process. It is supposed that in the course of such measurements, 'A particle manifests itself through its entire wave function...  instead of manifesting like a point particle as in the usual measurement. The wave function neither becomes entangled nor collapses...'. (p. 4624) The suggestion is that 'protective measurements' could provide a kind of direct empiric access to the superposition state - an access that would make possible in a single experiment simultaneous measurements of eigenvalues of even non-commuting observables, without leading to a "reduction of the wave packet", and without violating the uncertainty relations. But even if in respect of some systems such measurements turn out to be possible, the empiric access to the state description would still not be quite as direct as in the classical case, where the state is described in terms of directly accessible observables, whereas the empirically accessable part of the quantum state is given only as a weighted sum of eigenfunctions - representations of eigenvalues - interpretable as possible outcomes of measurements associated with observables. Thus it is indeed true that protecting ψ from "collapse" during a measurement '... is not unlike in classical physics where also a system needs to be held in place in a given state when a measurement is being made...'. (p. 4624) Nonetheless, in the classical case we have direct empiric access to the observables defining the state, whereas in the quantum case we may have direct empiric access only to what we regard to be eigenvalues of observables associated with states (i.e. not to the complete states, as such), albeit in the case of 'protective measurements' the usual problem concomittant with this access may be avoided. But this direct inaccessibility of ψ is hardly surprising given that it is a state description, the most natural state space of which is an abstract Hilbert space. Thus to those attached to direct empiric accessibility as the only mark of reality status ψ is but a mathematical fiction, and the quantum formalism but a convenient predictive tool. But from the point of view suggested here - that we could regard the potential truthlikeness of an hypothesis to stem from the distinct and valid testability of its scope and projectibility, or that the hypothesis in question (e.g. ψ) be embedded in or linked to an hypothesis that is so testable - the formalism of Q.M. may be truthlike, and hence all its constituent hypotheses (including, of course, its distinctly testable symmetries, thought to make that truthlikeness possible, but not including its non-discardable passive symmetries) are likely to share in this truthlikeness, even if they are not themselves open to direct and distinct empiric scrutiny. Be that as it may, 'protective measurements', if implementable, could constitute a partial experimental resolution of the measurement problem, since such a measurement process may well be adiabatic with respect to quantum time scales - partial, since the problem posed by the domain specificity of Q.T. (discussed above) would remain. Nonetheless, a protective measurement would, of course, strengthen the case for a realist view of both ψ and the formalism, even if we could still not make classical sense of the level of reality suggested by them, and of the interaction of that level with the classical one. From the point of view of the present stance, intimately linked to Noether invariants, 'protective measurements' would be particularly helpful, because, '... in the examples considered... the protective measurement determines directly the current densities of conserved quantities such as charge, energy, momentum, and angular momentum... [and] this is done deterministically for a single system which gives reality to these conserved current densities.' (P. 4625)​[38]​ 
Be that as it may, given that HP restricts a theory's viability to adiabatic processes, this raises the question of the adequacy of HP qua constraint on a theory meant to account for apparently discrete events, or sudden changes of state, in its domain, as well as on the interface between its domain and the classical one. And if HP is indeed inadequate for the task in respect of the quantum domain then the standard quantum formalism may be expected to be incomplete.
There are thus a number of indicators which point to the possibility that the theory is in some sense incomplete, and that hence we need not be surprised that it fails to handle measurement interactions satisfactorily. But this view stems solely from a realist perspective, which holds that physics ought to provide accounts not only of measurement outcomes - the non-realist stance - but also of how it is that those outcomes are what they are. This point may be made clearer by contrasting the situation in Q.T. with that in S.R.. In the domain of S.R. outcomes of measurements of length and time intervals are meant to be frame dependent. But the domain of Q.T. also entertains a kind of relativity principle which stems from experience, i.e. measurements of undulatory or corpuscular aspects (or traits), from either matter or radiation, are dependent on experimental conditions. Now both of these relativity principles appear to suggest a diminution of the objective character of physical description. But in the case of S.R. this appearance is easily dispelled, because S.R. provides a realist account of the relativity of outcomes of measurements, in the form of two symmetry principles - the equivalence of all inertial frames and the invariance of c - from which the relativity principle follows. Thus the realist view of S.R. is that the domain of S.R. is such that the two symmetry principles on which the theory rests hold in it, hence the relativity of measurements of length and time intervals. In sharp contrast, standard Q.T. provides no account of the dependence of measurements of items in its domain on experimental conditions. Thus whilst the theory is satisfactory from a non-realist perspective - given that it provides an account of outcomes - it is unsatisfactory from a realist perspective, since it fails to provide an account of how it is that those outcomes depend on experimental conditions. Nonetheless, for a theory to be unsatisfactory, or incomplete, with respect to its purported domain, is, at least prima facie, not incompatible with its being truthlike with respect to that domain. 
In brief: the stance that the standard quantum theoretical formalism may be truthlike of its purported domain seems entirely reasonable, given the following considerations: (a) the cosmological indication that quasi-autonomous levels of physical reality arose from an initial state of the Cosmos at the Big Bang; (b) the evolutionary biological and historical indication that our perceptions, and our ordinary notions linked to them, are likely to be inappropriate for making sense of levels far "below", and far "above", our phenomenological one; and (c) the possession on the part of the standard formalism of a distinct symmetric-structure, apparently distinctly and validly corroborated within the domain of the formalism - a structure which, although but truthlike, may nonetheless latch on to parts of a posited symmetric-structure of physical reality, thereby endowing the formalism with some projective generality. Thus, notwithstanding our inability to make classical sense of standard Q.T., it may nonetheless be truthlike. And given the understandable limitations of our perceptions and their associated concepts, our failure to make classical sense of the theory (which may anticipate a more complete formulation) is to be expected. This symmetry based metaphysical realist approach to Q.T.. obviates its attendant interpretational problems, and thus stays clear of much more fanciful metaphysics (DeWitt and Graham, 1973; Bell, 1981; Redhead, 1995; Lockwood, 1996; Mermin, 1998; and Wallace, 2002) - predicated on the posit that the description of both the state and its unitary evolution are complete. Whatever the reasons motivating such approaches (Saunders 1996), their outcomes clash intensely with most people’s intuitions. Although, as indicated, intuition cannot reasonably be taken to stand in the way of realist interpretations of deep theories,​[39]​ nonetheless, the extent to which we should allow our metaphysical speculations to outstrip our intuitions is not at all clear - even when those speculations are linked to a scientific theory, which ought to keep them from being empirically arbitrary. 
Perhaps parsimony considerations of some sort have a role to play in respect of alternative metaphysical interpretations of scientific hypotheses, particularly when there are no compelling logical or empiric reasons to choose between the variety of such interpretations. Now the most parsimonious "interpretation" of physical theories is, of course, the non-realist cop-out, the logic of which implicates the view that the notion of physical state has no objective counterpart (presumably, not even when such a state is prepared in the laboratory); a view which relegates talk in physics to be about nothing at all, with the exception of talk about the adequacy or not of theoretical structures in respect of outcomes of measurements. But then given that those outcomes, particularly the corroborative successful ones, would have no good account, they are perhaps best relegated to the realm of the miraculous, thereby placing the non-realist stance outside the bounds of the naturalist outlook. The parsimonious realist has two options for interpreting Q.T., both of which would regard the theory to be incomplete, but in differing senses. One option is to see the quantum mechanical state description to be a representation of a quantum system (or of equivalent such systems) possessing objective dispositional attributes, or objective potentialities, which have associated objective propensities (encoded in the state description) for yielding definite measurement outcomes (in the classical domain) with characteristic probabilities, in any sequence of identical tests (i.e. experiments) on the system (see Note 22 and Teller 1996). This view accepts the non-classical counterintuitive idea of the possibility of a domain of physical reality consisting of not quite separable (hence not quite isolatable) systems, possessing a range of objective potentialities (testable up to a point) with respect to the classical domain, and accepts that the realisation of those potentialities occur, either spontaneously, or via some not understood interaction with the classical domain. The source of the incompleteness of the theory, according to this view, is to be sought in its failure to suggest an objective mechanism which could be responsible for the realisation of a particular quantum potentiality in the classical domain. Only an objective mechanism could plausibly account for the predicted and observed  definite frequency of this or that outcome in a sequence (albeit finite) of identical experiments. The subjectivist view - that a definite outcome, or a definite frequency of outcomes, is somehow observer dependent (a dependence which the theory cannot account for) - is hardly capable of providing such an account; on the contrary, it leads to the expectation of a random spread of outcomes. There is no explanatory value in that view; it is therefore redundant, from a parsimonious perspective regarding interpretation. We are thus led to the realization that the role of the observer in such quantum experimentation is confined to preparing a system and the instrumentation for its tests, and that nature alone - or the puzzling interaction between classical instrument and quantum system (which may constitute an unavoidable interference of the former with the latter)​[40]​ - is responsible for the outcomes of such tests. Be that as it may, it has often been supposed that quantum effects are, or ought to be, present in the classical domain; hence there is a need to explain either their absence, or their apparent absence, in that domain; and that a solution of the measurement problem would lead to the desired explanation. But if the idea that the validity of standard Q.T. in the classical domain is unclear, because of the effective domain specificity of the theory (sect 1) - which would rule out the possibility of the "paradox" of Schrödinger's cat being both dead and alive simultaneously, since the superposed state would apply only to the radioactive material in Schrödinger's box - then that supposition (that we should expect quantum effects in the classical domain) is perhaps premature, and so is the view that standard Q.T. ought to yield a full account of the interface between the quantum and classical domains.​[41]​ The second option open to a parsimonious realist is to regard the theory to be truthlike but incomplete, not because it fails to suggest an objective mechanism responsible for the realisation of quantum potentialities, but more fundamentally because it fails to tell just which state a quantum system is in, when not observed. This view, which was in some form held by Einstein and Schrödinger, is traceable to an inability to contemplate the idea of a domain of physical reality consisting of systems, which when unobserved, do not possess definite states but only a "superposition" of states, implicating a range of potential outcomes when an attempt is made to observe such a system.
Einstein (1950, p. 342) distinguished between a metaphysician who is tamed by theory which must answer to 'sensory experience' plus "simplicity", and one that is not so tamed, who '...believes that the logically simple is also the real'. Evidently standard Q.T. is not as good at this sort of taming as other physical theories, notwithstanding that it does answer to 'sensory experience' (up to a point) plus "simplicity"; a situation that may well point to its incompleteness with respect to its purported domain. For it seems reasonable to expect a physical theory to provide sufficient knowledge of its domain (in the form of traits of systems and of possible interactions of such systems, when not observed), to give a plausible account of how it is that we measure what we measure when probing those systems. In the light of that expectation the standard quantum theoretical formalism is clearly incomplete. Thus Bell's (1966b) remark appears apt, '… it seems that the quantum mechanical description will be superseded. In this it is like all theories made by man. But to an unusual extent its ultimate fate is apparent in its internal structure. It carries in itself the seeds of its own destruction.'​[42]​ 
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^1	  1A valid test being one that could bring into contact a singular hypothesis and its test-phenomenon, consequent to that its attendant projection and model mediation problems could be resolved, via deductive-empiric means. 
^2	  Truthlikeness has been characterized in terms of a likeness, or similarity, relation referring to likeness of common symmetric form (suggesting continuity), as well as to likeness of  uncommon symmetric content, hence of uncommon extent of symmetricity (suggesting a discontinuous stepwise approach to the true symmetric-structure and thus to the true theory).
^3	  I ignore here the possibility that quantum statistics (as it may touch on the dynamics of individual particles) may account for the statistics (as it concerns an ensemble of individual particles), and hence for the t-irreversible trait, of St.M. (Albert, 1994). It is thus supposed that the indeterministic implications of Q.M., as regards the dynamics of constituents of statistical mechanical systems, can be neglected. Thus I consider only classical thermal systems in which Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics holds. However, the stance as regards the points at issue here - testability of distribution functions and the status of statistical mechanical theories - tranfers mutatis mutandis to quantum thermal systems (hυ/kT ~ 1), in which Bose-Einstein or Fermi-Dirac statistics hold.  
^4	  The introduction of a statistical posit in order to arrive at statistical conclusions is in line with Popper's (1982a, p. 106) point that, 'Probabilistic premises are ... indispensable for statistical conclusions'. Popper (1977, pp. 459-460) relates that Einstein  took issue with this point, suggesting that statistical conclusions can be gotten from a deterministic theory, and he provides some examples. However, it seems that in those examples probabilistic notions are introduced from outside the deterministic context. Be that as it may, the apparent exception to Popper's view is Q.M., where we do appear to get statistical predictions without statistical premises, i.e. from a deterministic formalism. However, it could be held that probabilistic premises are already "encoded" in the quantum mechanical state description. 
^5	  See also Feynman, et. al., 1963, Ch. 46.    
^6	  It may be possible to '... explain why equilibrium statistical mechanics works, if we can provide principled reasons for why the details of the microconstituents are by and large inessential for accounting for the thermodynamic or macroscopic behavior observed.' (Batterman, 1998, p. 207) But that would still not explain how the behavior of microconstituents gives rise, under certain conditions, to thermal systems with novel traits. 
^7	  To my mind, a fully satisfactory account of St.M., perhaps unattainable, would be one that could formally recover from the foundational theory t-irreversible equations, such as Boltzmann's equation, without resort to extraneous hypotheses. The available approaches are all open to the sceptical claim that St.M. is a product of a list of theoretical conceptions with dubious realist credentials in order to save the phenomena - e.g. in the Gibbs picture, "phase space", "ergodicity", "coarse graining", etc. Of course, it is possible to view a statistical t-irreversible description as more foundational than a deterministic t-reversible one, but then we are still faced with the problem of providing an account of how the former accomodates the latter (but see Bishop, 2004). For a concise description of Gibbs' approach see Lawrie (1990, Ch. 10), and on the problems facing that approach see Ridderbos (2002). See also Redhead (1995, pp. 26-33) and Ridderbos and Redhead (1998).     
^8	  For general discussions of the reductionist issue see (Popper, 1974; Rohrlich, 1988 and 1989; Sarkar, 1992; Leggett, 1992; Scerri, 1998; Schaffner, 1993, Ch. 9, and 1998; and Bickle, 1998). It may be noteworthy that the incomplete reductionist thesis does not clash with Bohm's wholistic thesis (Bohm, 1980).    
^9	  On how the notion of emergence looks from a quantum mechanical point of view see Kronz and Tiehen (2002).
^10	  In the case of intertheory reduction, complete reduction would mean that if T1  is reducible to T2 than it is also deducible from T2. But if the two theories are incompatible then although T1 may be reducible to T2 , it will not be deducible from T2. Hence no complete reduction can be had, in such cases. For a critique of an argument against complete reductionism see (Sober, 1999).
^11	  From this perspective we may expect that some problems would be soluble only at the macro, or phenomenological, level (Mosini, 1995).  
^12	  The problem the complete reductionist thesis faces, in relation to life organisms, has been poignantly depicted by Woodger (1962, p. 293): 'The following statement occurs in an article by an eminent geneticist: "It is well known how the introduction of an organised assembly of genes in the form of a goat unto an oceanic island may completely change its flora, fauna and physiography." This is an astonishing statement to find in a scientific book; for science is supposed to be the pursuit of truth, and this statement is palpably false. The effect of introducing an organised assembly of genes in the form of a goat unto an oceanic island cannot possibly be well known because the experiment has never been performed; and it has never been performed for the very good and sufficient reason that there is no such thing as an organised assembly of genes in the form of a goat. We could speak sensibly and truly of goats being assemblies of genes only if goats were composed of genes in the same sense in which a lump of sulphur is believed to be composed of sulphur atoms. But genes are supposed to be parts of chromosomes, and even chromosomes have parts which are neither genes nor parts of genes; chromosomes again are parts of cell nuclei, but such nuclei have parts which are neither chromosomes nor parts of chromosomes; nuclei in their turn are parts of cells but cells have parts which are not nuclei, neither are they parts of nuclei; finally some cells are parts of goats, but goats have parts which are not cells and are not parts of cells. Thus goats are very complicated objects and cannot be identified with assemblies of genes, however well organised they may be.'  
^13	  To regard the uncategorical prediction to be a categorical one admittedly leads to the possibility of regarding the observed spontaneous fluctuations as refuting the categorical prediction, and hence the theory. To avoid this consequence we need to account for the fluctuations without invoking Maxwell's demon. But whether or not this can be done (Earman and Norton, 1998 and 1999), it is important to consider whether the broad prediction of the theory is refutable, regardless of the attendant prediction of small spontaneous fluctuations. For if its broad prediction were to be refuted then the theory would indeed be untenable. Of course, the theory can be expected to be false in the sense that its continuous distributions are meant to be approximations to a discrete reality, but such falsity does not deprive the theory of the possibility of being truthlike. 
^14	  The idea that relative time scales involved in thermal phenomena ought to be taken seriously is in accord with Callender's (2001, p. 547) suggestion that thermodynamics ought not to be taken 'too seriously'. Thus for Callender, 'Thermal equilibrium corresponds to a special set of microscopic trajectories that leave the macroscopic properties of a system, for a certain observational time scale, approximately constant (and the time scales need not be the same for all macroscopic observables).' [My italics]  
^15	  E.g. for a gas in the classical domain (hυ/kT<<1) the theory predicts a Maxwellian velocity distribution at equilibrium.
^16	  On the distinction between probability and number density see (Grad, 1958, pp. 218-219).
^17	  On the possibility that single events in an unrealisable denumerably infinite sequence have a probabilistic account see (Railton, 1978; Watkins, 1984, Ch.6; and Gluck and Gimble, 1997). And on the propensity account of single cases in a statistical sequence see ( Miller, 1994, Ch.9; Howson and Urbach, 1993, pp. 338-352; and Gillies, 2000).
^18	  e.g.: For measurements of quasi-stationary velocity distributions in electrically neutral gases see Tolman (1979, pp. 645-649); and Adkins (1987, pp. 53-55); for measurements of electron velocity distributions and their approach to equilibrium in low energy plasmas see Bekefi (1966, Ch.2); etc. Measuring the approach to equilibrium could be made more rigorous if quantitative estimates of relaxation rates could be extracted from the theory for experimentally realisable systems. Writing in 1958 on possible future developments in theoretical St.M., Grad (1958, p. 243) pointed out that among other desiderata, ' ... we would expect to be able to estimate the approach to equilibrium in terms of exponential decay times.' But he added, 'At the present time the programme outlined is largely unaccomplished.'
^19	  An opposite view is held by Cartwright (1983). For her, only phenomenological thermodynamics is, or may be, descriptive. The statistical mechanical distributions are apparently but fictions since, 'They cannot be seen; they cause nothing,...' (p. 156), notwithstanding that, '... in some simple special cases the idea of the probability distribution can be operationalized; and the tests support the distributions ascribed by the theory.' (pp. 153-154) And, one may add, notwithstanding that the theory does yield an account, however problematic, of phenomenological thermodynamics. But from her own perspective - causal power as the mark of objective status - the status of the distributions, albeit not of the theory, ought to be seen on a par with the status of other testable unobservable entities, given the comparatively unproblematic testability of the distributions in a host of systems. For although we do not observe the intended referents of the continuous distribution functions that are thought to approximate discrete distributions - we observe neither the distributed quantity nor the discrete particles over which it is meant to be distributed - unless their existence is supposed there is no account of what the instruments display. We are faced with one particular display rather than with myriads of other possible displays, and the only way to account for this phenomenon is to suppose - admittedly with the help of background knowledge - that the intended referents of the distribution functions are the cause of that particular display. The situation is completely analogous to the case of particles. For example, instruments displaying tracks in bubble chambers and our conjecture - again with the help of background knowledge - that the causes of the tracks are particles of particular properties. [It is possible to see such conjectures as outcomes of IBE (Shimony, 1993c, p. 43), but it is also possible to see them as outcomes of inferences to the most probable causes, which Cartwright approves of (p.92).] Thus if the reality of particles is acceptable on the ground that they are causal agents, then testable statistical mechanical distributions also qualify for such acceptance. Moreover, what is generally regarded to be causally efficacious depends on the state of our theoretical and technological knowledge, as in the case as to what is generally regarded to be observable or detectable. Statistical mechanical distributions may yet find their causal manipulative technological uses if they have not already done so. Be that as it may, it seems as true to say that they cause an experiment to issue in one particular distribution function rather than myriads of other possible ones, as it is to say that the electron charge causes an experiment to issue in one particular number rather than myriads of other possible numbers.  
^20	  For the standard formulations see standard texts. For some other formulations and interpretations, see e.g. DeWitt and Graham, 1973; Hughes, 1989; Shimony, 1993, II; Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Cushing, 1994; Bub, 1994 and 1997; Dürer, et. al. 1995; Clifton, 1996a and 1996b; Lockwood, 1996; Plaga, 1997; Mermin,1998; and Dickson, 1998      
^21	  Einstein and Popper (Einstein, 1969, pp. 665-688; Hughes, 1989, pp. 162-164) interpreted the theory to be a classical statistical theory, where the statistics has its origin in a classical ensemble of classical systems, rather than in an ensemble of superposed states of a single system, or in an ensemble of eigenvalues of a family of observables. In the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation the ensembles may be regarded to originate with ensembles of spatial regions, or time durations, in which a single quantum entity may be found (Schiff, 1969, pp. 665-688). The source of quantum statistics may also be traced to the non-Boolean structure of the properties of quantum systems; a structure implicated by the theory (Bub, 2000a and 2000b). 
^22	  See also (Hughes, 1989, Ch. 8; and Howson, 1995).    
^23	  Notably, predicted eigenvalues are measurable with great precision since the limits to measurability imposed by the uncertainty relations apply only to simultaneous measurements of eigenvalues of non-commuting observables (Hughes, 1989).    It may be of interest to note here that Q.M. may be seen as a kind of testable bridge between a statement about possibilities, i.e. possible or potential values of observables, and statistical conclusions about their relative frequency of occurrence or appearance in appropriate measurements. This is of interest in the light of von Mises's point (as related by Popper, 1982b, pp. 68-74), '... there is no logical or mathematical bridge ... which leads from premisses about possibilities, to statistical conclusions about relative frequencies.', and in the light of Popper's propensity interpretation of the probability calculus (Popper, 1957; and Gillies, 2000) - his distinction between probability (propensity) and statistical (relative frequency) statements - which suggests that the calculus may be regarded to be such a bridge.                                                                                                                                                    Popper's propensities may be associated with quantum probabilities. Thus tests of quantum probabilities, just as tests of other probabilities, are grounded on measurements, to the extent possible, of relative frequencies of outcomes. However, we may interpret the relative frequencies as being indicative of relative propensities of the prepared quantum state, or of experimental set-ups in non-quantum statistical cases, to produce the frequencies. But, given the superposition principle, the proposal that propensities be associated with  seems to make better sense (Liu, 1994). Accordingly, quantum probabilities may be regarded to be 'displays' of the propensities encoded in  for particular experimental conditions. Teller (1995, p. 105) may have something similar in mind, '... states simply characterise propensities for what will be manifested with what probability under various activating conditions.' We may thus regard the propensities to be testable, to the extent that the probabilities are testable: 2 may be interpreted as a "testable" probabilistic measure of the relative weights, or relative propensities, encoded in , but attached to the possible values of observables. Thus the "testable" relative probability of an outcome is a measure of the relative propensity associated with that outcome. Analogously, we may perhaps associate propensities with the symmetric-structures of theories satisfying the CC, and regard the possible dynamics those structures characterise as displays of those propensities. The idea is that the testable symmetric-structure of a theory - seen here to largely characterise the domain within which the class of phenomena the theory can account for may occur - can also be seen as encoding a class of propensities for the possible actualisation of that class of phenomena, within the domain selected by the symmetric-structure. However, unlike quantum propensities, which can be regarded to be testable only via quantum probabilities, the propensities we would associate with symmetric-structures could be regarded to be directly testable given the distinct and valid testability of symmetries. But although symmetries are apparently testable, their posited link with truthlikeness is not, i.e. the idea that an embedded symmetry constitutes a propensity for its embedding theory to be truthlike is not a testable proposition. Thus, the symmetry account of truthlikeness and the propensity account of  are both metaphysical explanatory hypotheses. See also (Redhead, 1992; and Barretta, et. al., 1995).
^24	  Observations of atomic spectra from distant stars and galaxies also suggest that empiric control is exercised over both the performance and projectibility of the theory or formalism. For given that the theory accounts for the observed spectra, the observations constitute tests of both its performance and the spatio-temporal invariance of this performance. Interestingly, Einstein (1922) took the sharpness of the wavelength of such spectra to constitute evidence for the spatio-temporal invariance of congruent relations, as would be given by his ideal practically rigid rods and ideal clocks, i.e. evidence for his 'practical geometry' (sect. F). 
^25	  For how these concepts may be understood in the light of Q.F.T. see Teller (1996).
^26	  I take it that Mermin has in mind both sorts of correlations, those between subsequent observations and non-local ones. 
^27	  More recently, Mermin (2003) correctly observes '…it is not surprising that the Copenhagen perspective would provide a congenial vehicle for developing quantum mechanics not to understand physical behavior, but to exploit physical behavior to represent and process knowledge.' But, of course, failure to understand physical behavior leaves us in the dark about the success of its exploitation.
^28	  According to Hume's analysis of the notion of cause - that it has no objective correlate, and arises but out of our repeated experiences of 'constant conjunctions', in the sense of experiencing repeated spatial contiguities and temporal priorities - this aspect of the theory poses no problem. But Hume's analysis is incompatible with a realist reading of S.R. and its realist implication for the notion of cause.   
^29	  Einstein's depiction of the Heisenberg-Bohr interpretation, in one of his letters to Schrödinger (Przibram, 1967, p. 31). 
^30	  The quantum theoretical account of specific heats of gases might be seen to suggest the validity and applicability of Q.T. in the classical domain. But the application of Q.T. in this case is to the structure of individual constituents of a gas, qua quantum systems. What this application does show, however, is that quantum effects may determine classical effects, or alternatively, that the quantum domain may affect the classical one.
^31	  E.P.R. consider two systems in a brief interaction, and their subsequent measurement. But they begin with a definition of an 'element of physical reality': 'If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.' (p.777) Given this definition and the uncrtainty principle (a consequence of Q.T.), which rules out the simultaneous prediction of sharp values of non-commuting observables, it follows that such observables cannot be simultaneously real. But then, '…the reality of P and Q depend upon the process of measurement carried out on the first system, which does not disturb the second system in any way. No reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit this.' (p. 780) E.P.R. thus conclude that Q.T. is incomplete. This conclusion, however, clearly depends crucially on a definition steeped in classical intuition and expressing classical determinism - it would not be difficult to come up with a definition that would be in accord with Q.T.. Apparently, E.P.R. cannot accept counterintuitive non-locality. However, the present approach is not overly concerned with counterintuitive indications of deep theories. As indicated, it regards Q.T. to be incomplete because the theory fails to provide a formal account of how classical dynamics emerges from quantum dynamics.
^32	  See Ghirardi, et.al. (1986); Bohm and Hiley (1993); Maudlin (1995) and Cushing (1996). On the problematic character of the classical limit even from the perspective of Bohm's theory see Cushing and Bowman (1999) and Cushing (2000).
^33	  Whether decoherence can resolve the measurement and boundary problems is in dispute; see Adler (2003) and Castagnino and Lombardi (2004). 
^34	  On desiderata for a more complete non-relativistic Q.T. see Shimony (1993e) 
^35	  Bohm's (Bohm and Hiley, 1993) rewriting of the quantum formalism suggests that its standard version is incomplete (or at least incompletely understood), with respect to its purported domain. And whilst his version removes its clash with S.R. on the determinism/indeterminism issue, the locality/non-locality (at least as regards correlations) clash, as well as the continuity/discreteness clash, remain. Thus in failing to take account of non-locality and of discreteness, S.R. must be incomplete, with respect to a domain wider than its own. But although Bohm's stance and the symmetry approach are in line on the incompleteness of both standard Q.M. and of S.R. - incompleteness at least with respect to wider domains then their own - Valentini's (1996) pilot-wave theory of the subquantum level is at odds with the symmetry approach on the development of physics suggested here. Valentini posits a subquantum disequilibrium state (characterised by an Aristotelian physics in which Lorentz invariance and energy conservation do not hold, but in which non-locality, determinism of the guiding field trajectories, and contextuality reigns) from which the present quantum statistical "phenomenological" equilibrium state (characterised by Born's condition, P =2, and associated with signal locality and uncertainty) arose. The reason Valentini's posit is at odds with the present account of truthlikeness is that the symmetric-structure of the disequilibrium state, or of its theory, is likely to be less similar to the true symmetric-structure of the true theory, presumably one governing the subquantum level, than is the case with the symmetric-structure of the equilibrium state, or of its theory. Nonetheless, if the physics of the "rock-bottom" level is indeed Aristotelian, then the present "phenomenological" Q.M., along with its symmetric-structure, could still be a truthlike representation of the present quantum equilibrium state, which must have been latent in the original subquantum disequilibrium state. Valentini's response to the underdetermination problem facing Bohm's theory (note19) is that his theory of the more fundamental subquantum level is immune to that problem (personal communication).        Deotto and Ghirardi (1998) suggested that Bohm's formulation faces an underdetermination problem: the possibility of infinitely many Bohmian like theories, all of which are capable of reproducing the results of standard Q.M., but each predicting different deterministic trajectories for the particles that are meant to comprise a system undergoing an evolutionary process. From the present perspective, it is significant that all these theories satisfy the same covariance and invariance requirements. We would thus expect that they should be fully empirically equivalent, inclusive of their predictions regarding trajectories. Since such equivalence does not obtain, we would have had to conclude that either the present approach to the realist issue (which is meant to encompass Q.M., as we shall see), or Bohm's approach to Q.M., or both, are misconceived. However, Holland (1998 and 1999) has exhibited a novel trajectory interpretation of Q.M., which modifies the de Broglie Bohm equation for electrons, in a way that 'fixes the guidance law'. But this '…demonstration does not exclude other guidance equations…'. For some other problems facing Bohm's theory see (Callender and Weingard 1997).   
^36	  The locality/nonlocality issue was meant to have been made palatable by Shimony's (1993f and 1993g) notion of 'peaceful coexistence' between Q.M. and S.R., regarding that issue. Accordingly, quantum mechanical nonlocal correlations cannot be used for signalling purposes, and S.R. is meant to forbid only superluminal signalling, not superluminal correlations (see  also Cushing 1996). However, Peacock (1998) suggests Shimony's approach to be vulnerable. Peacock also suggests that the relativity principle, '... expresses a realist intuition, that what things and events are in themselves is fundamentally unaffected by the way they are observed. ... But QM presents a deep challenge to the whole realistic programme of basing physical theories on invariance principles of presumed universal applicability, for it tells us that the reality we observe can be in itself changed or determined in some unclear way by the means with which we choose to observe it.' (p.142) From the viewpoint of the present stance, however, QM itself rests on invariance principles, including a relativity principle, i.e. Galilean invariance; invariance principles whose apparent comparatively unproblematic distinct testability suggests that at least their posited objective counterparts are aspects of quantum reality that do not depend on the 'means with which we choose to observe' that reality. And although the applicability of invariance principles embedded in a theory is confined to the domain of the theory, and is thus contingent on the conditions that demarcate that domain, those conditions may obtain anywhere in the universe; the applicability of invariance principles, within their respective domains, is thus universal. For other attempts to reconcile QM and SR see Redhead (1987; and1995, Ch.3);  Maudlin (1994); and McCall (2000). 
^37	  In Feynman's path-integral formulation of Q.T. the quantum analogue of HP, or of stationary action, is stationary phase, yielding the path of maximum probability:   S/h, where S is the change of action along the path (Wheeler, 1964, pp. 69-70).
^38	  See also (Aharonov, et. al.,1996; Dickson, 1995; and Anandan and Brown, 1995).
^39	  Thus scientific realists are quite content to accept the lessons of 20th C. physics as regards, e.g. matter and radiation having the capacity to display both "wave" and "particle" traits in certain domains, the relativity of "simultaneity" in the special relativistic domain, etc. Such cases instantiate the breakdown of the efficacy of our intuition with respect to deep reality, something to be expected in the light of evolutionary biology (sect. A).
^40	  Whilst such interference or disturbance may be the source of the measurement problem, that does not, of course, mean that it must also be the source of quantum mechanical indeterminacy (see Brown and Redhead, 1980).
^41	  For further discussion of the issues touched on here (particularly the interface problem, and 'protective measurements'), plus other related ones, see Busch (2002), and references therein.  
^42	  Perhaps a better grasp of the quantum domain requires a non-linear, t-asymmetric, theory of quantum gravity, which could recover the present Q.T. - see Penrose (2001). 
